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In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (LMRA or
the Act)' in an effort to bring the democratic process to industrial relations.2
The Act is premised on the belief that workers' freedom to bargain collec-
tively provides a peaceful and equitable method for determining terms and
conditions of employment.3 Accordingly, Congress explicitly announced
that our national labor policy should encourage the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and protect workers in the exercise of their full free-
dom of association, self organization, and designation of bargaining repre-
* First Place, John H. Fanning Labor Law Writing Competition, Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America, 1987.
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 395, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1982)). The National Labor Relations Act and the Labor-
Management Relations Act are commonly referred to singularly. This Comment will refer to
both as LMRA or the Act.
2. Statements made by Senator Robert F. Wagner indicate that the Wagner Act aimed to
bring democracy to industry:
The principles of my proposal were surprisingly simple. They were founded upon
the accepted facts that we must have democracy in industry as well as in government;
that democracy in industry means fair participation by those who work in the deci-
sions vitally affecting their lives and livelihood; and that the workers in our great
mass production industries can enjoy this participation only if allowed to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO
L. REV. 9, 12 (1982) (quoting Senator Wagner in M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, at 321 (1970)). Senator Wagner also said:
The development of a partnership between industry and labor in the solution of na-
tional problems is the indispensable complement to political democracy. And that
leads us to this all important truth: there can no more be democratic self-government
in industry without workers participating therein, than there could be democratic
government in politics without workers having the right to vote ....
Id. (quoting Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?. in THE WAGNER ACT: AFTER TEN YEARS 13
(1945)).
3. Summers, supra note 2, at 13-14.
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sentatives of their own choosing.4 Congress aspired that freedom to select
bargaining representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining would as-
sure industrial peace.
5
The freedom to select bargaining representatives, therefore, is a critical
step towards realizing the ambitions of the Act. Section 9(d) 6 of the LMRA
provides the statutory procedure by which workers select their exclusive bar-
gaining representatives.7 The Act vests the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or the Board)' with the responsibility of administering the represen-
tation provisions of the statute. 9 Section 9(d)' ° details the method for ob-
taining judicial review of an NLRB representation decision. The Act's
review provisions, however, do not permit direct judicial review of represen-
tation decisions because appeals delay and interrupt the collective bargaining
process. "
Considering the importance of the representation process to our national
labor policy, it is curious that unions do not have a viable method for ob-
taining judicial review of NLRB representation decisions. The LMRA per-
mits employers, 12 but not unions,' 3 to seek appellate review of NLRB
4. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
5. Id. § 141(b).
6. Id. § 159(d).
7. An election for representation is decided by a majority of the votes cast. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASEHANDLING MANUAL pt. 2, § 11340.4, at 152 (1984). This
method of determining election results reflects the "majority rule" principle. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a). When a unit of employees elects a labor organization as its bargaining representa-
tive, that labor organization is the exclusive representative for the entire unit of employees.
Therefore, even if an employee within the unit decides against joining the union, the employee
is still represented by the union. This rule requires the employer to bargain only with the
certified labor organization; the employer may not enter into a separate contract with an indi-
vidual working within the designated bargaining unit. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,
337-38 (1944).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 153.
9. Id. § 159. Section 9(a) of the Act provides that the bargaining representative selected
shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. Id.
§ 159(a). Section 9(b) of the Act instructs the National labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) to determine the appropriate unit for bargaining. Id. § 159(b). Section 9(c) directs the
Board to investigate any petition for an election, filed by either an employee, a labor organiza-
tion, or an employer, to determine whether there is a legitimate question concerning represen-
tation. Id. § 159(c). Section 9(d) provides the scheme for judicial review, id. § 159(d), and
§ 9(e) provides the procedure by which the employees in a bargaining unit can request an
election to rescind a union shop agreement. Id. § 159(e). For a detailed discussion of repre-
sentation proceedings and the election process, see generally I C. MORRIs, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 341-412 (2d ed. 1983).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d).
11. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
13. But see infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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representation decisions in the federal circuit courts of appeals. Addition-
ally, in Leedom v. Kyne, 14 the Supreme Court foreclosed district court re-
view. The Court held that absent some narrow, "extraordinary
circumstances," parties are precluded from repairing to federal district
courts for injunctive relief.' 5 The Court's reasoning, in Kyne and its prog-
eny,' 6 for precluding review in the district courts focused on injunctive re-
lief's potential discordance with congressional intent to avoid delays and
interruptions in the election and collective bargaining processes. 17
Wholly unaddressed by the Supreme Court, however, was the availability
of review for declaratory relief. Declaratory relief may permit examination
of rights and legal relations when alternative relief is unavailable.'" Argua-
bly, Kyne bars declaratory relief if it engenders the same harms to the elec-
tion' 9 and collective bargaining processes as injunctive relief causes. This
Comment explores the availability of declaratory relief in federal district
courts to unions seeking judicial review of representation proceedings. The
Comment proceeds from the premise that Congress could not have intended
to permit declaratory relief if it provokes the harms Congress sought to
avoid by enacting limited and indirect review provisions. Accordingly, this
Comment will identify the preferred values and policy considerations under-
lying the LMRA's representation election review provisions. An evaluation
of declaratory relief's potential to disrupt these value and policy choices per-
14. 358 U.S. 184, 188-91 (1958).
15. Id.; accord Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 479-80 (1964) (adopting the
"extraordinary circumstances" language).
16. Boire, 376 U.S. at 473.
17. See, e.g., id. at 478-80; see also Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642
F.2d 492, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981); Bishop v. NLRB,
502 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1982), provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal
taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 or a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not fur-
ther relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Id. § 2201(a).
19. There are three common types of elections. First, there is the election for choice of
bargaining representatives. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Second, there is the election to decertify a
union that is a certified bargaining representative. See 2 C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 1614-15.
Third, there is an election to rescind a union shop agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e). In general
terms, a union shop agreement requires that employees in the bargaining unit, within thirty
days of commencement of employment, pay union dues. See generally H. MILLIS & E.
BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STORY OF NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 515-16 (1950) (discussing types of elections).
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mits a principled judgment as to whether the declaratory judgment proce-
dure should be available to unions seeking judicial review.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM CREATED BY LIMITED
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Section 10(e) and (f) of the LMRA2° creates federal jurisdiction in the
federal circuit courts of appeals to review final orders issued by the NLRB
following an unfair labor practice. A representation order is not a final or-
der within the meaning of the Act's review provisions. E' However, section
9(d)22 permits the federal appellate courts to review a representation order
when it is the basis of an unfair labor practice decision. Consequently, an
NLRB representation order can be reviewed only by triggering the Act's
unfair labor practice review provisions.
Typically, in the representation election process, unions and employers
raise legal issues concerning the NLRB's authority to order a representation
election, 23 the appropriateness of the bargaining unit for which the election
is sought,24 and the eligibility of certain classes of employees to vote in the
20. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f).
21. A representation order is not a final order within the meaning of § 10(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c), and, therefore, does not trigger the Act's review provisions. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S.
401, 409-11 (1940); see also infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d).
23. The NLRB may lack statutory jurisdiction to order a representation election. The
Board's statutory jurisdiction encompasses labor relations matters which affect commerce. See
NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939) (Board's jurisdiction is coextensive with congres-
sional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause). The Board's jurisdiction, however, is
limited by certain statutory exclusions. Certain employers, for example, are not covered by the
Act. Section 2(2) of the Act specifically states that the word employer "shall not include the
United States or any wholly owned Government corporation." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Similarly,
the Act excludes certain employees from coverage. Among the employees excluded from cov-
erage are domestic servants, independent contractors, supervisors, and agricultural workers.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
Furthermore, § 14(c)(l) of the Act authorizes the Board to decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute when "the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1). Section 14(c)(l)
permits the Board to decline jurisdiction over any class or category of employers. Id.; see, e.g.,
Cleveland Ave. Medical Center, 209 N.L.R.B. 537 (1974) (declining jurisdiction over a small
medical practice because its activities were local in nature and did not warrant Board proce-
dure). For a thorough discussion of NLRB jurisdiction, see J. FEERICK, H. BAER & J. ARFA,
NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 37-56 (1980).
The Board may also lack authority to order a representative election when there is no question
concerning representation. See id. at 106-12. For a discussion of questions concerning repre-
sentation, see infra note 151.
24. "A bargaining unit is a group of employees who may properly be grouped together for
the purposes of participating in an NLRB election and for collective bargaining." J. FEERICK,
H. BAER & J. ARFA, supra note 23, at 265. Section 9 of the Act authorizes the Board to
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requested election.25 If, after deciding these issues, the NLRB orders an
election and the union wins, the employer may respond by refusing to bar-
gain with the union.26 The union can be expected to file a timely refusal-to-
bargain charge, and the NLRB will find that the employer refused to bargain
in good faith. 2 The employer's refusal to bargain, a violation of section
8(a)(5) 21 of the Act, is an unfair labor practice. When the employer seeks
appellate review of the NLRB's bargaining order, the underlying certifica-
tion, which motivated the refusal to bargain, becomes part of the record of
the unfair labor practice proceeding and subject to review.29 On review, the
court of appeals will consider the employer's previously unsuccessful posi-
tion on the challenged representation issue to determine if the election was
valid and created a duty to bargain with the winning union.3"
Unions, however, do not have a parallel method for triggering the unfair
labor practice review provisions when they lose a representation election be-
cause their responsive conduct would be unlikely to precipitate an unfair
labor practice.3 ' Consequently, in the absence of a violation of the Act, un-
ions have no means of gaining access to the courts to review the union's
position on the representation issue.
determine whether the unit set out in the petition is appropriate for purposes of engaging in
collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). The Board has developed a community of interests
test for making appropriate bargaining unit determinations. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1950).
Under the community of interests doctrine, "the Board will weigh the similarities and differ-
ences with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment among the members of
a proposed unit, rather than relying solely on traditional job classifications." J. FEERICK, H.
BAER & J. ARFA, supra note 23, at 270 (footnote omitted).
25. F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 143
(2d ed. 1986).
26. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act imposes on the employer the duty to bargain with a certified
union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
27. Section 8(d) of the Act requires parties to bargain in good faith. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
Section 8(d) defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Id.
In determining good faith bargaining, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he inquiry must
always be whether or not under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obliga-
tion to bargain in good faith has been met." NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54
(1956). Although good-faith bargaining is difficult to define, it requires " 'the serious intent to
adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground.' " NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960) (quoting I NLRB ANN. REP. 85-86 (1935)). The Act,
however, does not "compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 29 U.S.C. § 159(d).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
29. Id. § 159(d).
30. See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 25, at 171-72 (discussing judi-
cial review of representation decisions).
31. But see infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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A statutory scheme providing limited judicial review makes Board deci-
sions in representation matters, to some extent, unchallengeable. Two com-
peting policy considerations support Congress' adoption of a limited and
indirect route for judicial review: (1) the need to minimize delay in initiating
the collective bargaining process and (2) the need to protect individual rights
from unrestrained administrative power. 32 The clash of these policies cre-
ates tension every time a party, such as a union statutorily denied judicial
review, loses a representation election.
Although the unavailability of judicial review for unions is not a central
issue in contemporary labor relations, it may be inhibiting the full achieve-
ment of the LMRA's goal. Congress enacted the LMRA to avoid industrial
strife by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
33
This policy implicitly assumes that collective bargaining would become, if
workers so desired, the dominant method for determining terms and condi-
tions of employment.34 The aspirations of the Act, however, have not
reached fruition. With the percentage of the nonagricultural workers repre-
sented by a labor organization and covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment declining at a significant rate, collective bargaining is not the dominant
industrial relations model in this country.35
Labor supporters explain sliding union support by pointing to employer
union-busting tactics, 36 employer tamperings with the Act, 37 and an anti-
32. Note, Judicial Review of Preliminary Orders of National Labor Administrative Agen-
cies after Leedom v. Kyne, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 372, 372 (1959).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
34. Summers, supra note 2, at 14.
35. The union density rate-the ratio of union members to the nonagricultural work
force-has steadily declined. Prior to the enactment of the Wagner Act, union density was
about 13%. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (1983). Within the decade following the passage of
the Act, union density rose to 35%. Id. Within the last 10 years, however, union density has
steadily declined. In 1975, 28.9% of the nonagricultural work force were union members. By
1980, the figure slipped to 23.2%. In 1982 union density was only 21.9%, and by 1984 less
than one of every five nonagricultural workers (19.4%) was a union member. L. TROY & N.
SHEFLIN, UNION SOURCE BOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE, FINANCE, DIRECTORY § 3.10
(1985); see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987, at 408 (107th ed. 1986). From the pre-Wagner Act
period to 1984, union density has risen from 13% to 19.4%. A 6% increase in the number of
workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement suggests that the inequality in the availa-
bility of judicial review may obstruct realization of the Act's goals.
The Railway and Airline Clerks, the Machinists, the Steelworkers, the Nurses Association,
and the Auto Workers suffered the sharpest losses in union membership. L. TROY & N. SHEF-
LIN, supra § 3.1. The 1984 statistics for union density by industry are: (1) manufacturing-
26%; (2) mining-17.7%; (3) construction-23.5%; (4) transportation-38.7%; and (5) serv-
ices-7.3%. Id. § 3.9.
36. It has become common-place for employers to engage in a union-busting effort to
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defeat an organizing drive. Presently, seminars, sponsored by employer associations and
taught by professional labor relations consulting firms, on how to defeat unions are widely
offered. Summers, supra note 2, at 15 n.24. Furthermore, management-side law firms adver-
tise their special skills for defeating unions. Id. Also, several texts are available to teach em-
ployers to defeat a union campaign. See generally J. HUNT, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO LABOR
RELATIONS (1979) (providing general guides to combating campaign organizing); R. LEWIS &
W. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS, MANAGEMENT'S STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE
PROGRAMS (1979) (discussing tactics and strategies for employers to win elections). While the
instruction offered may not be unlawful, many of the tactics suggested reflect and encourage a
confrontational hostility towards the collective bargaining process. See generally R. LEWIS &
W. KRUPMAN, supra, at 88 (supervisors advised to aid the employer in opposing the union).
37. Congress enacted the Wagner Act to encourage collective bargaining in order to avoid
industrial unrest. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. In order to achieve this pur-
pose, employees must have the opportunity to freely elect, or choose not to elect, their bargain-
ing representatives without coercion. See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note
25, at 93-107 (discussing several ways employers interfere with workers' free choice). The
need for free and uncoerced elections is reflected in the rule that Board elections are to be
conducted in "laboratory conditions," free from coercion and threats of reprisal. General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). An election can serve its true purpose only if the
surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free and untrammeled choice for or
against a bargaining representative. Id. at 126. Under the laboratory conditions rule, the test
of conduct which may interfere with the laboratory conditions is considerably more restrictive
than the test of conduct amounting to an unfair labor practice. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962). Conduct not rising to an unfair labor practice can still be
conduct warranting a new election. Id. Despite this protective rule, there is evidence indicat-
ing that employers have increasingly engaged in coercive tactics. See generally Weiler, supra
note 35, at 1779-81 (documenting the rise in employer unfair labor practice charges). One of
the most harmful coercive tactics is the dismissal of an employee for union support. The
discriminatory discharge, a violation of § 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), has a three-
fold effect: (1) it prevents the union supporter from voting; (2) it removes a potential union
campaigner from the plant; and (3) it chills employees supporting, or considering supporting,
the union. Weiler, supra note 35, at 1778. The number of § 8(a)(3) discharge cases has in-
creased substantially over the years. In 1975, 13,426 § 8(a)(3) charges were filed. Id. at 1780.
By 1980, the figures increased to 18,315. Id. Furthermore, the NLRB has estimated that 90%
of all discriminatory discharges take place during either organizing campaigns or first contract
negotiations. Id. at 1781 n.35.
Interestingly, as § 8(a)(3) charges have risen, the union victory rate in representation elec-
tions has dropped: (1) 1965-61% victory rate; (2) 1970-56% victory rate; (3) 1975-50%
victory rate; (4) 1980-48% victory rate. Id. at 1776. By 1984, the union success rate had
dropped to a low 43%. 48 NLRB ANN. REP. 197 (1983). While the correlation between an
increasing number of § 8(a)(3) charges and decreasing union victory rate may not alone prove
cause and effect, there is further evidence indicating that coercive conduct affects election re-
sults.
In a study performed by Dr. William Dickens, it was determined that unfair labor practices
reduced the number of prounion votes by 4%. W. Dickens, Union Representation Elections:
Campaign and Vote (Oct. 1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (available at the Department
of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) [hereinafter Dickens dissertation], dis-
cussed in Weiler, supra note 35, at 1784. When the unfair labor practice was a threat or action
against a union supporter, the figure rose to 15%. Weiler, supra note 35, at 1784 (citing Dick-
ens dissertation). Comparing the union victory rates in the United States with the union vic-
tory rates in Canada, where representation campaigns have been eliminated, provides
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union Labor Board.3" While commentators disagree about the merits of
these accusations,39 many cite these as reasons for the decline in organized
labor.' Furthermore, the truth of any of these allegations would suggest the
need for union access to appellate courts.
Establishing the anti-union bias of the Labor Board, however, is not essen-
tial to justifying use of declaratory relief. The severity of the public debate
itself, with union leaders instructing their members to avoid the Board4' and
the American workers' apparently losing confidence in the laws designed for
their protection,4 2 indicates a crisis. If the existing congressional scheme for
judicial review permits declaratory relief in representation cases, the declara-
tory judgment procedure could alleviate whatever contribution the Act's re-
medial inadequacies add to the crisis.
additional support for the argument that coercive tactics during a representation campaign
affect the outcome of the election. Id. at 1786 n.61.
38. The Reagan Board has been publicly criticized for its decisions overruling firmly es-
tablished rules and precedents. See Greenberger, Reagan NLRB Tilts Toward Management,
Wall St. J., Aug 2, 1982, at 17, col. 3. For a listing of some of the cases, see Cohen & Bor, The
National Labor Relations Act Under Seige: A Labor View of the Reagan Board, in LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 1983 § 4.02 (1983); Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea
for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163 n.1 (1984).
In Professor Weiler's opinion, a major factor in the decline in unionism is employer opposi-
tion to unions coupled with the law's failure to respond to unfair labor practice charges against
employers. Weiler, supra note 35, at 1771-74 & n.7. Other authorities have not been as kind:
[T]he authors agree with the criticism which has been directed at the Board and
submit that a conclusive case has been made that the present Board is probably the
most result-oriented, antilabor, and antiworker Board in the history of the Act. In-
deed, it is the authors' conclusion that the Board, as an administrative vessel, is not
only off course, it has been taken over by pirates who are methodically scuttling the
Act which they are charged to protect.
Cohen & Bor, supra § 4.01.
39. Professor Paul Weiler supports the position that the decline in organized labor stems
primarily from coercive employer tactics and a Labor Board condoning such conduct. See
Weiler, supra note 35, at 1771-86. Professor William Gould, in contrast, claims that labor's
position is based on mistaken assumptions. See Gould, Mistaken Opposition to the N.L.R.B.,
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at A27, col. 2.
40. Another often cited reason for the decline in organized labor is that "the stronghold of
American unionism-older, male, blue-collar workers employed in manufacturing industries
in the northern United States-has constituted a declining fraction of the work force." Weiler,
supra note 35, at 1773 n.6.
41. Trost & Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a Dead Letter, Wall St. J., Aug. 16,
1984, at 8, col. 2.
42. Summers, supra note 2, at 17.
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II. THE LMRA's JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS: LIMITED REVIEW
OF NLRB REPRESENTATION DECISIONS IN THE
COURTS OF APPEALS
Section 9 of the LMRA 43 regulates the procedures by which bargaining
representatives are selected." As a general rule, there is no direct judicial
review of representation decisions in the courts of appeals. Section 9(d), the
only provision of the Act expressly relating to the review of representation
proceedings, provides for appellate court review of certifications under sec-
tion 10(e) or (f) in connection with unfair labor practice orders.45 Section
9(d) provides that whenever an unfair labor practice order is based in whole
or in part on a representation proceeding, the representation decision be-
comes part of the record for appeal on the unfair labor practice order.46
For all practical purposes, an employer's loss of a representation election
triggers section 9(d). The dissatisfied employer may refuse to bargain with
the Board-certified union, forcing the union to file a section 8(a)(5)47 unfair
labor practice charge against the employer. Generally, the Board issues a
complaint, finds a violation for refusal to bargain, and issues cease and desist
and bargaining orders pursuant to section 10(c).48 The employer, in turn,
either appeals the Board's orders to the circuit court of appeals pursuant to
section 10(f),4 9 or refuses to comply with the orders, causing the Board to
petition the court of appeals under section 10(e) for enforcement.5° Whether
review is through the employer's section 10(f) appeal or the Board's section
10(e) petition for enforcement, section 9(d) provides that the underlying cer-
tification becomes part of the record considered by the court of appeals re-
43. 29 U.S.C. § 159.
44. For a description of the statutory provisions governing the representation election
process, see supra note 9.
45. See generally 2 C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 1714 (discussing the Act's review
provisions).
46. Section 9(d) provides in full:
Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 10(c) is based in whole or
in part upon facts certified following an investigation pursuant to subsection (c) of
this section and there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such
certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of
the entire record required to be filed under section 10(e) or 10(f), and thereupon the
decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order
of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceed-
ings set forth in such transcript.
29 U.S.C. § 159(d).
47. Id. § 158(a)(5).
48. Id. § 160(c).
49. Id. § 160(f).
50. Id. § 160(e).
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viewing the unfair labor practice order."' The operation of these sections
assures the employer the opportunity for appellate review of a representation
order.2
A union, in contrast, does not have a viable method for obtaining review
when it has lost an election. Theoretically, section 8(b)(7)(B)5 3 provides un-
ions an indirect method of appellate review because it prohibits picketing for
recognition following a "valid election." 4 A union might intentionally vio-
late section 8(b)(7)(B) by picketing for recognition after losing an election,
thereby causing the NLRB to issue a cease and desist order." Section 10(f)
treats the Board's section 8(b)(7)(B) order as an appealable final order. 56 To
establish the section 8(b)(7)(B) unfair labor practice, the General Counsel
must prove that the union picketed for recognition following a "valid elec-
tion."57 Thus, the underlying representation proceedings would become
part of the record for the court of appeals to review to determine the validity
of the election.5 8
The judiciary, however, has not embraced section 8(b)(7)(B) as a mecha-
nism for unions to obtain judicial review. For example, in NLRB v. Inter-
state Dress Carriers, Inc., 59 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit gave
three reasons for denying review under section 8(b)(7)(B). First, an em-
ployee can be discharged for cause if he pickets in violation of section
8(b)(7)(B).6 ° Second, the employer must file the unfair labor practice
charge, and he or she may find the picketing insufficiently disruptive to war-
rant filing a section 8(b)(7)(B) charge. 61 Third, recognition of section
8(b)(7)(B) review encourages disruptive picketing and is inconsistent with
51, Id. § 159(d). See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 25, at 170-74
(discussing judicial review of representation proceedings).
52. The underlying representation order does not automatically become part of the record
of the unfair labor practice charge. The representation proceeding must be predicated on the
same actions giving rise to the unfair labor practice. As the Supreme Court has stated, the
representation case becomes part of the record only when the representation proceeding and
the complaint on unfair labor practices "are really one." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 146, 158 (1941).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B).
54. Id.
55. The Board's remedial powers for § 8(b)(7)(B) charges are limited to injunctive relief,
29 U.S.C. § 160(l), and a cease and desist order upon a determination of the charge on the
merits. Id. § 160(c).
56. But see infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B).
58. Id. § 159(d).
59. 610 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1979).
60. Id. at 108, cited in Note, Leedom v. Kyne and the Implementation of a National Labor
Policy, 1981 DUKE L.J. 853, 859-60.
61. Interstate Dress Carriers, 610 F.2d at 109.
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that section's purpose of limiting disturbance of industrial peace.62 While all
the reasons offered by the Third Circuit are compelling, the most convincing
is the court's admonition of disruptive picketing. Permitting unions to ob-
tain review of representation decisions through section 8(b)(7)(B) only serves
to fuel industrial strife.
Although the Act limits access to the federal appellate courts, virtually
precluding unions' from obtaining appellate review, its representation review
provisions are silent as to district court jurisdiction.6 3 Administrative law
doctrine recognizes the general jurisdiction of federal district courts6 4 to
hear requests for equitable relief by parties statutorily foreclosed from re-
view.6 5 Congress, however, may enact statutes completely precluding a
party from district court review.66 On its face, the LMRA leaves open the
question whether a party may seek injunctive or declaratory relief for repre-
sentation decisions in the federal district courts.67 When addressing this
question, however, courts have narrowly construed the Act and, in cases
such as Leedom v. Kyne, 68 have produced the rule of nonreviewability for
injunctive relief and its narrow exceptions.69
62. Id.
63. For a thorough discussion of the district courts' subject matter jurisdiction to review
NLRB representation decisions, see infra note 117.
64. The federal district courts exert jurisdiction over administrative agency action under
three types of statutes. First, a federal district court may exercise jurisdiction under the Judi-
cial Code. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1337 (1982). The Judicial Code provides for several types of
review, including district court review based upon a general federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
and original jurisdiction of actions arising under a federal law regulating interstate commerce.
28 U.S.C. § 1337. See generally 5 B. 'MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 45.03 (1987) (general discussion of district court jurisdiction to review administrative agency
action). Second, district court jurisdiction exists when the action arises under one of the public
information sections of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. § 45.03. Finally, a district
court has jurisdiction to review agency action when an agency statute specifically grants such
jurisdiction. Id.; see also Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1979).
District court jurisdiction over Board representation decisions arguably arises under § 1331
or § 1337 of the Judicial Code. See Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d
492, 495 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
65. See, e.g., Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 183-84 (1938); see also K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 176 (1977); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 769, 772 (1958).
66. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
67. See Goldberg, District Court Review of NLRB Representation Proceedings, 42 IND.
L.J. 455, 458-60 (1967) (Professor Goldberg provides a facial analysis of the Act).
68. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
69. Id. at 188-91; accord Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 479-80 (1964) (describ-
ing the narrow, "extraordinary circumstances" that comprise the exceptions to the rule of
nonreviewability). There are three exceptions to the rule of nonreviewability. For a discussion
of the Kyne exception, see infra text accompanying notes 83-90. For a discussion of all three
exceptions, see infra note 89. See generally 2 C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 1714-19 (discussing
review of representation decisions).
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III. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW: NONREVIEWABILITY WITH ITS
NARROW EXCEPTIONS
A. Pre-Kyne Decisions
Soon after the passage of the Wagner Act, unions challenged the exclusiv-
ity of the Act's statutory review procedures. In AFL v. NLRB,7 ° the
Supreme Court ruled that a representation order is not a "final order ' 7 ,
appealable directly to the court of appeals.7 ' The Court recognized Con-
gress' intent73 to allow judicial review of representation decisions only when
such decisions are part of a final Board order made in an unfair labor prac-
tice proceeding.74 In so ruling, the Court defined the parameters of appellate
review on board representation decisions. The Court did not, however, fore-
close the district court from hearing an independent suit because "that ques-
tion [was] not presented for decision by the record.",75
Almost twenty years passed before the Court squarely addressed the ques-
tion left open in AFL v. NLRB. In the interim, however, the lower federal
courts split on the issue. 7 6 Most notable of the pre-Kyne decisions was Fay v.
70. 308 U.S. 405 (1940).
71. Id. at 504. It is a common occurence in administrative law for the availability of
judicial review to depend on the definition attached to a reviewable "order." Professor Jaffe
elaborates:
The representation case is but one example of a not uncommon situation in which by
reason of the definition of a reviewable "order" in a given statute certain definitive
administrative acts do not qualify for review as "orders." The statute may require a
"final" order. The statute may provide for review of an "order" upon a record made
at a hearing, from which it may be inferred that an order not based on a hearing is
nonreviewable. Many actions not qualifying as "orders" will be preliminary and
would normally be denied review because administrative remedies have not been ex-
hausted. But some rulings pendente lite may cause serious injury which cannot be
undone by later review: for example, the compulsory production of documents may
expose secrets entitled to be protected against unauthorized disclosure. In such cases
the restrictive statutory definition of "order" should not be-and in that situation
was not-construed as foreclosing review.
Jaffe, supra note 65, at 772.
72. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. at 411.
73. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
of the Act.
74. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. at 410 nn.2-3.
75. Id. at 412.
76. Among the cases finding district court jurisdiction were Farmer v. United Elec. Work-
ers, 211 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954); Worthing Pump &
Mach. Co. v. Douds, 97 F. Supp. 656, 660 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 28 L.R.R.M. 2267 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); R.J. Reynolds Employees' Ass'n v. NLRB, 61 F. Supp. 280, 281 (M.D.N.C. 1943);
Reilly v. Millis, 52 F. Supp. 172, 173 (D.D.C. 1943), aff'd, 144 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 879 (1945); Klein v. Herrick, 41 F. Supp. 417, 420-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Cases
in which district court jurisdiction was not found include De Pratter v. Farmer, 232 F.2d 74,
76 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Volney Felt Mills v. LeBus, 196 F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1952); Norris Inc.
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Douds.7 In Fay, a union was denied a place on an election ballot, and the
Board's regional director 78 refused to hold a preelection hearing. 79 The
union sought injunctive relief in district court alleging the Board denied the
union due process by refusing to hold a hearing before the election. 8' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a constitu-
tional claim, not "transparently frivolous," vests the district court with juris-
diction to hear the claim on the merits.81
While Fay instructs that a district court, in exercise of its equity jurisdic-
tion, can hear a constitutional claim not transparently frivolous, 2 no deci-
sion addressed whether an independent, nonconstitutional claim could be
brought in district court until Kyne.
B. The Leedom v. Kyne Exception to the Rule of Nonreviewability
In Kyne, a suit for injunctive relief, the Supreme Court addressed the sole
issue of federal district court jurisdiction to vacate a Board representation
order made in excess of its statutory authority.8 3 The Court held that a
district court had jurisdiction to enjoin a Board representation order only
when the order is made in excess of the Board's delegated power and con-
trary to a specific prohibition of the Act.84
v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F.2d 714, 716-17 (2d
Cir. 1948); Madden v. Brotherhood & Union of Transit Employees, 147 F.2d 439, 445 (4th
Cir. 1945).
77. 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
78. Section 3(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes the NLRB to delegate powers to re-
gional directors under § 9 of the Act:
(b) The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any
or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. The Board is also authorized to
delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 9 to determine the unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for
hearings, and determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an
election or take a secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 9 and certify the
results thereof, except that upon the filing of a request therefore with the Board by
any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director dele-
gated to him under this paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless specifically
ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken by the regional director.
29 U.S.C. § 153(b).
79. For a discussion of preelection hearings and procedure, see generally J. FEERICK, H.
BAER & J. ARFA, supra note 23, at 147-92.
80. Fay, 172 F.2d at 723.
81. Id.
82. Id. The Board has not challenged the Fay decision. Instead, "in suits claiming consti-
tutional violations, the Board has defended on the merits." Goldberg, supra note 67, at 467-
68.
83. 358 U.S. 184, 185 (1958).
84. Id. at 188.
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While Kyne permits unions to obtain district court review, its holding is
extremely limited. Unions can invoke the Kyne rule only when the Board
violates a clear and explicit statutory directive.85 In addition, the Act's leg-
islative history compels courts to narrowly read Kyne.8 6 In Boire v. Grey-
hound Corp., 87 a suit to enjoin a representation election, the Supreme Court
gave Kyne its most restrictive interpretation, carving out the general rule of
nonreviewability88 and defining the parameters of the "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" when Kyne applies.8 9
The Boire Court noted that the legislative history of the Act's review pro-
visions plainly reveals Congress' intent to avoid delays in the commence-
ment of collective bargaining. The Court reasoned that a restrictive
interpretation of Kyne, significantly limiting access to the district courts for
injunctive relief, would be consistent with the legislative intent and purposes
of the Act because injunctive relief would result in the delays in collective
bargaining that Congess intended to prevent. 90 A suit for declaratory relief,
however, may not cause delays in collective bargaining and, therefore, may
be consistent with the legislative intent underlying the Act's review
85. In Kyne, the statutory directive was the § 9(b)(1) prohibition against ordering a unit
comprised of professional and nonprofessional employees unless a majority of such profession-
als vote for inclusion in such unit. Id. at 188-89; see also Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v.
Fanning, 642 F.2d 492, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (discussing the required strict speci-
ficity of a statutory command for invoking Kyne jurisdiction), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917
(1981). Kyne, however, left open the issue of whether its holding should apply to the Board's
failure to act in violation of an affirmative mandate. For a discussion of this issue, see F.
BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 25, at 172-73.
86. Judge Goldberg reflects these sentiments in Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir.
1974):
Nowhere in the statutory scheme does Congress mention district court review of
NLRB orders in representation cases, and there is a reason for that profound silence.
The underlying purpose of the Act is to maintain industrial peace, and to allow em-
ployers and unions to rush into federal district court at will to prevent or nullify
certification elections would encourage dilatory tactics by dissatisfied parties and lead
to industrial unrest.
Id. at 1027 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
87. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
88. Id. at 481-82.
89. Id. at 479-80. Courts recognize three narrow exceptions to the general rule of
nonreviewability. The first is where the lawsuit presents "public questions particularly high in
the scale of our national interest because of their international complexion." McCullock v.
Sociedad Nacionel de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963). The second is when the
plaintiff makes a clear and strong showing that the Board violated his or her constitutional
right. Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949). The third is that of Kyne and Boire.
See Florida Bd. of Business Regulation v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 1362, 1368 n.12 (11 th Cir. 1982);
Bishop, 502 F.2d at 1027-28.




IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT
The limited-access review provisions adopted by Congress in the Wagner
Act were largely influenced by Congress' dissatisfaction with the Act's pred-
ecessor, Public Resolution 44.92 Public Resolution 44 created the first Labor
Board, which administered the provisions of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act.93 The resolution allowed for immediate judicial review of represen-
tation elections "with the result that efforts to certify representatives and get
the bargaining process going were readily thwarted by the employer's taking
of any certification to court for review." 94 The House Report for the Wag-
ner Act states that "under [Public Resolution 44's] provision for review of
election orders employers have a means of holding up the election for
months by an application to the circuit court of appeals .... The ability of
employers to block elections has been productive of a large measure of in-
dustrial strife." 95
The legislative history of the Wagner Act suggests that due to the experi-
ence with Public Resolution 44, Congress intended to prevent the delays in
workers' selections of bargaining representatives precipitated by direct ap-
pellate review. Consequently, Congress passed section 9(d) of the Wagner
Act permitting only indirect review. 96 Congress hoped indirect review
would alleviate Public Resolution 44's problems while providing "an exclu-
sive, complete, and adequate remedy whenever an order of the Board made
pursuant to section 10(c) is based in whole or in part on facts certified fol-
lowing an election or other investigation pursuant to section 9(c)." 97
The complete and adequate remedy referred to by the House Report is
91. For an analysis of whether declaratory relief would result in delays in the collective
bargaining process, see infra text accompanying notes 143-62.
92. H.R.J. Res. 375, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 12453 (1934) (repealed 1966).
93. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (repealed 1966).
94. Note, supra note 32, at 377.
95. H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2960 (1985).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d).
97. H.R. REP. No. 972, supra note 95, at 20, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2977 (1985). The applicable part of the
House Report on the Wagner Act states in full:
As previously stated in this report, the efficacy of Public Resolution 44 has been
substantially impaired by the provision for court review of election orders prior to
the holding of the election. Section 9(d) of the bill makes clear that there is to be no
court review prior to the holding of the election, and provides an exclusive, complete,
and adequate remedy whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to secion 10(c)
is based in whole or in part on facts certified following an election or other investiga-
tion pursuant to section 9(c).
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available only to aggrieved employers.9" Section 9(d) provides no method
for unions to obtain review of election orders. 99 Consequently, the members
of the 76th Congress introduced two bills providing labor organizations and
other aggrieved parties with direct review in the courts of appeals."° Testi-
fying before the Senate, Charles Fahy, former general counsel of the NLRB,
described his objections to the proposed bills: "Whereas prior to the present
act the employers used this review of certifications or direction of elections
as a means of defeating collective bargaining, rival unions would now do
so. ' l I,1 Congress ultimately rejected both bills,1"2 leaving labor organiza-
tions without a viable method for obtaining judicial review.
Some years later, Congress again attempted to amend the Act's review
provisions. In 1947 Congress passed the Taft-Hartley amendments to the
Wagner Act. 10 3 In considering the amendments,' °  Congress examined a
House bill containing an amendment to section 10(f) to provide direct re-
view of Board representation orders for any aggrieved party.'0 5 The Confer-
ence Committee omitted the House amendment to section 10(f), leaving the
Wagner Act's review provisions substantially intact. The Conference Com-
mittee apparently heeded Senator Taft's warning that this proposal "would
permit dilatory tactics in representation proceedings."'
' 0 6
Id., reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935,
at 2977 (1985).
98. Goldberg, supra note 67, at 466.
99. But see supra text accompanying notes 53-62.
100. Goldberg, supra note 67, at 463.
101. National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearings on S. 1000, 1264,
1392, 1550, 1580, and 2123 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 462 (1939) (emphasis added).
102. See Goldberg, supra note 67, at 464.
103. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1982)).
104. Among other changes to the Wagner Act, Taft-Hartley added an unfair labor practice
sections specifically applicable to union activity. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
105. The House Report offered these comments in support of the proposed amendment to
§ 10(f):
Appeals from certification. The present act permits appeals from certifications by
the Board only by employers .... This procedure is unfair to everyone; the union
that wins, which frequently must wait for many months to exercise its rights; [and]
the union that loses, which as no appeal at all no matter how wrong the certification
may be ....
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 334 (1974) (emphasis added).
106. 93 CONG. REC. 6602 (1947). The House Minority Report stated similar objections to
the proposed House Bill:
If this proposal is enacted into law it would have serious adverse consequences on
collective bargaining. It is conservatively estimated that [one] year would be the
average time necessary to obtain court review of a Board certification .... Delay
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The Act's legislative history suggests that Congress recognized the dispar-
ity and tensions created by the Act's review provisions. 10 7 Nevertheless,
when Congress weighed the advantages of direct appellate review for em-
ployees and their unions against the potential disruptions in industrial peace
direct review might create,10 8 Congress decided that the latter outweighed
the former.' 0 9
In sum, enlightened by its experience with Public Resolution 44, Congress
sought to promote industrial stability by restricting the opportunity for us-
ing judicial review to: (1) delay the commencement of collective bargaining
and (2) block or disrupt existing bargaining relationships. Congress did not,
however, consider whether the statutory scheme of review would permit de-
claratory relief as opposed to injunctive relief.
V. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
As a practical matter, a prayer for declaratory relief is often joined with a
request for injunctive relief." 0 The Supreme Court, however, has indicated
that district court equity jurisdiction may depend on the remedy re-
quested. "' In Steffel v. Thompson, 112 the Court ruled that in cases challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a state statute, declaratory relief is appropriate if
a state proceeding has not yet commenced, but injunctive relief is im-
proper." t3 The Court reasoned that an injunction would prevent all suits
from being prosecuted by the state, whereas a declaratory judgment would
give the court the option of declaring unconstitutional a particular applica-
tion of the statute.' 14 In Steffel, the Court's decision was influenced by prin-
ciples of federalism.'1 5 While the principles of federalism do not affect
judicial review of Board representation decisions, Steffel offers a valuable
principle: "requests for injunctive and declaratory relief [should not be
would be piled upon delay, during which time collective bargaining would be sus-
pended pending determination of the status of the bargaining agent. Such delays can
only result in industrial strife.
H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 105, at 94 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 385 (1974).
107. Goldberg, supra note 67, at 465.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 64, § 46.03.
111. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 469-71.
115. Id. at 472-73.
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treated] as a single issue." '116
Steffel indicates that the type of relief sought by the plaintiff can be deter-
minative of the district court's jurisdiction. 17 Applying the Steffel principle
116. Id. at 463.
117. A district court is authorized to grant declaratory relief pursuant to § 2201 of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. Section 2201, however, is a purely remedial
statute and does not confer jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S.
667, 671 (1950); see also Jarrett v. Reson, 426 F.2d 213, 216 (9th Cir. 1970); Hatridge v. Aetna
Causualty & Surety Co., 415 F.2d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. United States, 494 F.
Supp. 1000, 1002 (E.D. Ky. 1980); A & M Gregos, Inc. v. Robertory, 384 F. Supp. 187, 189
n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1974). District court jurisdiction, therefore, must be obtained through some
other statute.
District court jurisdiction to review administrative agency conduct often arises under § 1331
or § 1337 of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1982). Section 1331, referred to as
the federal question jurisdiction statute, states that "the district court shall have original juris-
diction of all actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (emphasis added). The mere fact, however, that a complaint is pleaded so as to
bring the action under a federal statute, such as the Wagner Act, does not necessarily mean
that action "arises under" that statute within the meaning of § 1331. See generally Note,
Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and The Declaratory Judgment Act, 4 VAND.
L. REV. 827 (1951) (analyzing "arising under").
Any attempt to define "arising under" must give consideration to the 1976 amendments to
§ 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a-552b (1982). In 1976 Congress amended § 1331 by removing the $10,000 jurisdiction
requirement for actions against the United States or an agency, officer, or employee thereof. 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). The Supreme Court interpreted
the 1976 amendments as having an obvious effect on district court jurisdiction over agency
action. In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the Court declared that Congress' removal
of the jurisdictional amount permitted the use of § 1331, subject only to other statutory limita-
tions, as a jurisdictional foundation for all actions challenging federal agency conduct:
On October 21, 1976, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 94-574, 2721, which amends 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) to eliminate the requirement of a specified amount in controversy as
a prerequisite to the maintenance of "any [§ 1331] action brought against the United
States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity."
The obvious effect of this modification, subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes
created or retained by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review
agency action, regardless of whether the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] of
its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate. We conclude that this amend-
ment now largely undercuts the rationale for interpreting the APA as an independent
jurisdictional provision.
Id. at 105.
The Supreme Court, therefore, has ruled that district court jurisdiction to review agency
actions will lie, subject only to a preclusion-of-review statute. Consequently, the question
whether a district court can hear a claim for declaratory relief of a Board representation order
will depend on whether the NLRA is a preclusion-of-review statute.
Determining whether an Act is a preclusion-of-review statute is a matter of statutory inter-
pretation. In Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1965), the court
considered whether the district court had properly exercised jurisdiction over a Board repre-
sentation proceeding. The court made clear that such jurisdictional determinations are dic-
tated by congressional intent:
The question whether the complaint asserts a claim upon which equitable relief may
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to district court review of NLRB representation decisions suggests that dis-
trict court jurisdiction may depend on the type of relief sought.
VI. DECLARATORY RELIEF IN REPRESENTATION CASES
A. Florida Board of Business Regulation v. NLRB
While the question raised herein is novel, the federal courts have begun to
address it. In 1982, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit decided Florida Board of Business Regulation v. NLRB 118
and offered some important insights. Florida Business arose from the
NLRB's decision to assert jurisdiction over the jai alai industry." 9 Two
rival unions initiated organizing drives for representation of two different
units of employees, jai alai players and pari-mutuel employees. 120  The
Board asserted jurisdiction over both units and directed an election, despite
protest by the employer that the Board should deny jurisdiction over the jai
alai industry. 2' The State of Florida, like the employer, also considered the
Board's decision erroneous.' 22 The state extensively regulated the jai alai
industry and feared that Board regulation of the jai alai industry would cre-
ate insurmountable conflicts.' 23 Accordingly, the state filed suit in the dis-
trict court to enjoin the election and to obtain a declaratory judgment that
be properly granted, however, is, affected by the general congressional policy to af-
ford "review" of matters arising under section 9 of the Act only after the Board has
ordered the complaining party to take some affirmative action based upon the
certification.
Id. at 20; see also Jaffe, supra note 65, at 770-74 (drawing references from a statute silent on
district court review); Note, supra note 32, at 375 (availability of review is largely a matter of
interpreting congressional intent). Accordingly, district court jurisdiction to grant declaratory
relief for a Board representation decision can only be accepted if the declaratory relief proce-
dure does not disrupt the legislative intent to avoid the dilatory tactics that postpone the com-
mencement of bargaining or disrupt bargaining relationships. Therefore, the premise this
Comment depends on appears sound: the declaratory judgment mechanism can be an ac-
cepted method for unions to obtain judicial review only if its does not result in the harms
Congress sought to avoid by enacting indirect and limited review provisions.
Section 1337 of the Judicial Code permits the district courts to assert jurisdiction over any
action "arising under" a federal law regulating commerce. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (emphasis added).
The test for "arising under" required by § 1337 is the same as those demanded by § 1331.
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local Union 327, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 508 F.2d
687, 699 n.34 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds sub nom. EEOC v. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co., 425 U.S. 987 (1976).
118. 686 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982).
119. Id. at 1365.
120. Id. at 1364, 1367.
121. Id. at 1365.
122. Id. at 1366-67.
123. Id. at 1366.
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the Board lacked authority under section 14(c)(1) 12 4 of the Act to regulate
labor disputes involving jai alai players and pari-mutuels.' 2 5 The district
court asserted that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the suit, but de-
clined to enjoin the election because the Board had not abused its discretion
under section 14(c)(1).' 2 6 On appeal, the Board challenged the district
court's subject matter jurisdiction,' 2 7 and the state asked for reversal of the
district court on the section 14(c)(1) issue.12 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court on the jurisdic-
tion issue. 2 9 The court held that while a district court, absent the extraordi-
nary circumstances rule of Kyne 130 and Boire, 131 could not enjoin an
election or the certification of election results, the district court did have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim for declaratory relief.'
32
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning focuses on the distinction between in-
junctive and declaratory relief. In Florida Business the state asked for in-
junctive and declaratory relief.'33 As to the injunctive relief, the court ruled
that the extraordinary circumstances rule set out in Boire 134 and Kyne 135
clearly applied and, because the facts did not qualify as an extraordinary
circumstance, denied injunctive relief. 136 As to the declaratory relief, how-
ever, the court held that the extraordinary circumstances rule did not act to
124. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1).
125. Florida Business, 686 F.2d at 1366.
126. Id. at 1368.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1370.
130. Id. (citing to Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958)).
131. Id. at 1369 (citing to Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 479 (1964)).
132. Id. at 1370. It appears that Florida Business has not generated much interest in the
legal community. In a brief analysis, commentators suggested that Florida Business stood for
the proposition that the Board does not have unbridled discretion to assert jurisdiction over an
industry heavily regulated by the state. Boisseau and Carlson, Labor Law, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 1319, 1345-46 (1983). The Second Circuit, in New York Racing Ass'n v. NLRB, 708
F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 914 (1983), gave the case cursory attention in a foot-
note. Id. at 57 n.6. The Second Circuit decided, without elaboration, that Florida Business
gave Kyne too narrow a reading. Id.
In Seafarers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3284 (D.D.C. 1983), the District
of Columbia Circuit distinguished Florida Business because the plaintiff in Seafarers, although
seeking declaratory relief, had a means of getting appellate review by filing an unfair labor
practice charge. Id. at 3286.
Because the plaintiff in Florida Business was the state, the case arguably could be limited to
those situations where the state claims injury by a Board representation order; however, no
court has yet limited Florida Business to those parameters.
133. 686 F.2d at 1366.
134. Id. at 1369 (citing to Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 479 (1964)).




limit district court jurisdiction.13 7 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Act's
legislative history and the extraordinary circumstances rule limit district
court jurisdiction when an employer or a rival union attempt to use the dis-
trict court to delay a Board-ordered election. 3 ' The court reasoned that a
suit for declaratory relief would not permit the use of the dilatory tactics the
legislature sought to avoid by limiting judicial review.' 39 Consequently, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court had subject matter juris-
diction over a claim for declaratory relief. " Based on this reasoning, the
court held that "a plaintiff who cannot seek review of the Board's order in
the court of appeals but who claims that the Board violated his federal rights
has the right to repair to the district court under any statute that may grant
the district court the power to hear the claim."''
The Eleventh Circuit posits the proposition that a suit for declaratory re-
lief would not cause the harmful delays in the collective bargaining process
Congress sought to avoid.' 4 2 The merits of this theory rest on whether de-
claratory relief provokes these harms.
B. Testing the Theory
If a union's challenge of a certification in a suit for declaratory relief
would not delay the collective bargaining process or disrupt existing bargain-
ing relationships, then the Act does not prevent unions from seeking such
relief in district courts. Testing the appropriateness of the declaratory judg-
ment remedy requires examination of two possible scenarios. The first con-
siders a single union organizing drive. The second envisions two or more
unions battling for the representation of a unit of employees.
The first scenario presumes that a losing union, dissatisfied with election
results, claims the Board erred in its appropriate bargaining unit determina-
137. Id. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly noted that the declaratory relief/injunctive relief
distinction influenced its decision:
It is true that in each case the State asked the district court to enjoin the Board-
ordered representation election. As to that prayer for relief the Board's position is
correct, for the extraordinary circumstances rule of [Boire] and [Kyne] was clearly
applicable. But the State's complaint asked for more than an injunction against a
Board election order; it sought a declaration that the Board lacked statutory and
constitutional authority to regulate labor disputes in the jai alai industry as a whole.
As to this prayer for relief, the extraordinary circumstances rule had no application.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1370.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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tion'4 3 thereby costing the union the election. Regardless of the correctness
of the Board's unit determination, the Act's election bar would prevent the
NLRB from holding another election for one year after the earlier elec-
tion. 4 4 Consequently, declaratory relief would not permit a union with its
declaration of law defining the bargaining unit in hand to rush back onto the
scene to request another election. In this scenario, the union's suit for de-
claratory relief would not cause delays in the collective bargaining process
because the workers rejected collective bargaining by voting against the
union as their bargaining representative. Thus, the union would not be certi-
fied' 45 as the bargaining representative, and the employer would not be obli-
gated to engage in collective bargaining.
The second scenario presumes that two unions are engaged in an organiz-
ing effort to represent the same group of employees. The losing union, be-
lieving that the NLRB's erroneous bargaining unit determination cost it the
election, will file for declaratory relief in a federal district court. If the court
agrees the Board erred in its unit determination and grants the losing union's
prayer for declaratory relief, that union could not rush back onto the scene
demanding a new election because the same election bar present in the one-
union scenario operates here. The losing union would be precluded from
filing a new election petition for one year. 146 Consequently, declaratory re-
lief would not disrupt the bargaining relationship'4 7 between the winning,
certified union and the employer for at least one year. Additionally, mean-
ingful bargaining between the employer and the winning union would not be
delayed 4 ' by the losing union's suit for declaratory relief because the elec-
tion bar protects the validity of their bargaining relationship for one year.
Moreover, because the winning union is certified by the NLRB following the
election, the NLRB's certification bar would also be in effect.' 49 The certifi-
143. The Board is vested with the authority to make determinations of appropriate bar-
gaining units pursuant to § 9(b). 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
144. Id. § 159(c)(3).
145. See generally I C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 411-12 (discussing certification of election
results).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
147. Congress fashioned the Act's review provisions to avoid disruptions in bargaining re-
lationships. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
148. Congress intended the Act's review provisions to avoid delays in the commencement
of collective bargaining. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97. In the two union scenario,
declaratory relief would not cause delays in the commencement of bargaining. The winning
union would be certified and the employer would be obligated to bargain with the certified
union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). Because of the election bar, the validity of that bargaining relation-
ship could not be challenged by the losing union for one year. Therefore, bargaining could
commence without delay.




cation bar prevents rival unions from filing a valid representation petition for
at least one year following the board certification of another union.'5 ° Fur-
thermore, this rival union scenario might invoke an additional protection of
the collective bargaining process-the contract bar.151 Pursuant to the con-
tract bar, the rival union could not file a representation petition during the
life of the contract between the employer and the certified union, except after
a three-year period and during some other narrowly defined open periods of
the contract. 152 In short, the existing bargaining relationship continues to be
guaranteed at least twelve months of insulation from external threats by the
election and certification bars153 and, in many instances, up to three years of
insulation due to the contract bar doctrine.' 54 Therefore, the harms Con-
gress sought to prevent are not provoked by the district court's granting of
declaratory relief.
These two scenarios illustrate that the declaratory judgment remedy does
not cause delays and disruptions in collective bargaining which Congress
sought to avoid. A grant of declaratory relief does not permit a union to
postpone or delay elections, nor does it allow a union to demand a new elec-
tion. Instead, the union must wait until federal labor laws permit the filing
of a new representation petition. Accordingly, there are no delays in the
collective bargaining process and no disruptions in existing bargaining rela-
150. Id.
151. When a labor organization files an election petition, it essentially asserts that there is a
question concerning representation (QCR). Generally, a QCR exists when a labor organiza-
tion seeks exclusive representation of a unit of employees, but the employer refuses to recog-
nize the union. See 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 341-43. There are four bars that preclude a
labor organization from raising a QCR: the election bar, the certification bar, the voluntary
recognition bar, and the contract bar. See id. at 352-66. While each of these bars indepen-
dently operates within their own set of rules, all four share the common objectives of promot-
ing industrial stability and encouraging stable labor relations. See F. BARTOSIC & R.
HARTLEY, supra note 25, at 147-50. Under the contract bar rule, a contract will operate to bar
an election for a period of three years. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
152. The contract bar doctrine allows for a 30 day open period during which a petition
(raising a QCR) may be filed. The open period begins 90 days and ends 60 days prior to the
expiration of the contract or after three years, whichever comes first. Another open period
arises after every three years or at the expiration of a contract provided no new contract is
executed. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 25, at 150. Further, if no QCR is
raised during the appropriate open period, a new contract will operate to reactivate the bar.
Shen-Valley Meat Packers, 261 N.L.R.B. 958, 960 (1982).
The declaratory judgment theory will not give rival unions the opportunity to disrupt ex-
isting bargaining relationships during an open period as an incumbent union can demand that
an employer continue bargaining during the open period. See RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B.
963, 965 (1982). However, if the employer knows, in good faith based on objective evidence,
that the incumbent no longer enjoys majority status, the employer must refuse to renegotiate
with the incumbent. NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 454 F.2d 5, 6 (6th Cir. 1972).
153. See supra notes 144, 149-50 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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tionships. It appears that the declaratory judgment theory satisfies congres-
sional standards.
The previous discussion of the election bar, however, reveals another com-
pelling value underlying our national labor policy. The election bar allows
an employer the opportunity to regroup and settle his business for one year
following the onslaught of a union organizing drive,' 55 and it encourages
business stability and economic prosperity by safeguarding the employer for
one year against another organizing drive.' 56 Although a union's suit for
declaratory relief would not join the employer as a party, an employer could
choose to intervene in the action.' 57 Assuming such employer intervention,
the unions suit for declaratory relief would entangle the employer in costly
and time-consuming litigation. This litigation would deny the employer an
opportunity to settle and stabilize his business. The declaratory judgment
theory, therefore, might conflict with the values promoted by the election
bar.
Regardless of the soundness of this reasoning, the election bar values
probably would not operate to strike down the declaratory relief theory for
two reasons. First, any conflict between the election bar values and the de-
claratory judgment procedure created by employer intervention in the
union's declaratory judgment action is the same conflict Congress allows to
exist between the LMRA's present review provisions and the election bar
values. As previously noted, under the LMRA's present review provisions,
an employer can obtain judicial review of an NLRB representation decision
by refusing to bargain with the winning, certified union.' The refusal to
bargain violates section 8(a)(5) and entangles the employer in the costly and
time-consuming litigation required to defend the section 8(a)(5) charge.' 59
Under such circumstances, the employer, following the election, would have
no opportunity to settle and stabilize his business. Consequently, the
LMRA's existing review provisions permit the sort of disruptions in business
155. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
156. Congress included § 9(c)(3), the election bar, in the Taft-Hartley amendments out of
the concern that the Wagner Act permitted a labor organization to subject an employer to
election upon election. Congress viewed this potential onslaught as both unfair to the em-
ployer and inconsistent with the Act's objective of promoting industrial stability. See 93
CONG. REC. 7529 (1947).
157. The Act confers intervention rights upon a successful charging party and a successful
respondent. United Auto. Workers Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 211, 216 (1965); see
also 2 C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 1700 (intervention rights).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52 (discussing employer's method for obtaining
judicial review).




that the election bar values seek to prevent.' 60 Second, the NLRB, not the
employer, is the defendant in the declaratory judgment action, and the
NLRB carries the legal burden of defending its decision in the representation
case. 16' Also, the NLRB is likely to support the same positions as the em-
ployer would because the NLRB decided the representation issue in the em-
ployer's favor. Accordingly, the employer may elect not to intervene
because the NLRB will defend its representation decision, and the informed
employer will know that courts give great deference to Board decisions.
162
C. "Further Relief" Under 28 U.S. C. Section 2202
One additional problem must be resolved before the declaratory procedure
can be accepted as a method for unions to obtain judicial review. Section
2202 of the Judicial Code 163 states that "[flurther necessary or proper relief
based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable
notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been deter-
mined by such judgment."'" 4 Thus, arguably, a district court judge could
order a new election as "further relief" to the declaratory judgment. 65 The
decision to give further relief is discretionary 66 and subject to various
limitations. 
67
In the arena of public and administrative law, there are two limitations
that prevent a federal district court from ordering a new election as further
relief. First, the doctrine of judicial restraint instructs a federal district court
judge to avoid unwarranted interference with a coordinate branch of govern-
ment.' 68 Accordingly, whatever the scope of a district court's authority
under section 2202, it must not unduly interfere with other congressional
policy, such as Congress' national labor policy. 169 As discussed previously,
Congress specifically fashioned the LMRA's review provisions to avoid dis-
160. For a discussion of the election bar values, see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying
text.
161. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 25, at 20-24.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 185-93.
163. 28 U.S.C. § 2202.
164. Id.
165. District courts are authorized to grant coercive relief in connection with a final declar-
atory judgment entered. See Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 92 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1937); Motor Terminals, Inc. v. National Car Co., 92 F.
Supp. 155, 161 (D. Del. 1949); see also Beacon Const. Co. v. Matco Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 392,
399-400 (2d Cir. 1975) (further relief awardable in a declaratory judgment action includes an
award for damages).
166. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
167. See, e.g., Cole v. McClellan, 439 F.2d 534, 533-36 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text for Congress' national labor policy.
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ruptions in existing bargaining relationships. 7 ° The question a federal dis-
trict court judge should address is whether an order directing a new election
would respect Congress' labor policy regarding judicial review. In the two-
union scenario, 171 if the court granted the losing union's request for declara-
tory relief and, as further relief, ordered a new election, the existing bargain-
ing relationship between the winning, certified union and the employer
would be interrupted. Consequently, the court's order directing a new elec-
tion would violate Congress' policy to prevent disruptions in existing bar-
gaining relationships. Furthermore, Congress included the election bar in
the LMRA to promote industrial stability. 172 An order by the district court
directing a new election, at a time when the election bar had not yet passed,
would clearly violate Congress' policy to ensure industrial stability and,
therefore, would be an improper exercise of remedial authority under section
2202.
Second, before a court can properly exercise its discretion to grant declar-
atory and further relief, it must take into account whether its action would
improperly intrude on matters committed to an administrative body. 173 The
NLRB, statutorily vested with the authority to create rules "as may be nec-
essary to carry out the provisions of [the Act],"' 174 crafted the certification
and contract bars175 to advance the LMRA's objective to promote the col-
lective bargaining process.176 These bars represent firmly entrenched NLRB
policies which have been given the stamp of approval by the judiciary.' 7 A
federal district court order directing a new election, made at a time when the
certification or contract bars had not expired, would undermine and improp-
erly intrude on NLRB and congressional policy to promote the collective
bargaining process.
VII. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
One potential problem with accepting the theory offered herein is that the
court's expanded jurisdiction might result in an unwise shift of authority
over labor disputes from the Board to the courts. By congressional design,
170. See supra text accompanying notes 92-109.
171. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
173. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246 (1952).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
177. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954) (approving certification bar); Bell & Howell
Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 149 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing with approval the contract bar
rule set forth by the NLRB in General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962) and
Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 997-1004 (1958)).
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the NLRB, and not the courts, has been assigned the primary role of umpire
in representation disputes."' 8 Election proceedings often involve difficult
and complex questions regarding labor relations that are unfamiliar to dis-
trict court judges. 179 Furthermore, the Board is an "expert" agency with
extensive, day-to-day experience in the administration of the Act. 8 ° The
NLRB possesses a familiarity with the circumstances, backgrounds, and re-
lationships comprising labor disputes and, therefore, is better equipped to
settle disputes than a district court judge. 81 The courts, however, provide
the immediate check against arbitrary agency conduct. Ample congressional
signals 8 2 and judicial opinions18 3 exist supporting the notion that Congress
did not intend Wx preclude the judiciary from exercising its checking function
in settling labor disputes.'8 4
Difficulty arises in striking a balance between the need for the NLRB to
exercise its expertise and the need for a functional judiciary, checking arbi-
trary agency conduct. 8 5 Florida Business suggests striking the balance by
allowing access to the judiciary for declaratory relief, while truncating the
district court's authority by requiring a deferential standard of review.'8 6 In
Florida Business, the NLRB asserted jurisdiction over the jai alai industry
notwithstanding the state's objection that the NLRB declines jurisdiction
over the dog racing industry, an industry similar to jai alai.l17 Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit struck down the Board's decision to assert jurisdiction
over the pari-mutuel employees only because the Board arbitrarily treated
the jai alai industry differently than the similarly situated dog racing indus-
try without offering good reasons. 188 The court asserted that the case could
178. Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1974).
179. Goldberg, supra note 67, at 479.
180. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52 (Congress permits employers to trigger the
Act's review provisions, thereby giving the judiciary the opportunity to check Board actions).
183. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
184. Id.
185. Congress can, and does, delegate its authority to administrative agencies. Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940). Congress delegated its authority to
the NLRB to administer the process by which workers select bargaining representatives. 29
U.S.C. § 159. Although Congress can preclude judicial review of agency action, see Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977), Congress has not completely precluded the judiciary from
exercising its checking function over NLRB representation decisions. See supra text accompa-
nyiag notes 182-84. The question, therefore, is how much deference Congress intended the
courts to display when reviewing NLRB representation decisions. Judicial deference is mani-
fested in the scope or standard of review employed by a court. See generally 2 C. MORRIS,,
supra note 9, at 1704-13 (scope of review of NLRB decisions).
186. 686 F.2d 1362, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982).
187. Id. at 1367.
188. Id. at 1372.
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have easily been decided differently "if the NLRB had given even scant justi-
fication for its different treatment of jai alai and race track pari-mutuel
employees." I 8 9
Finding that the statutory scheme for judicial review fashioned by Con-
gress permits declaratory relief does not create risks of judicial overreaching.
The standard of review, rather than the district court's jurisdiction, presents
risks of judicial overreaching. The Eleventh Circuit's standard appears to be
the accepted standard for review of representation decisions.' 9° Generally,
the Supreme Court has held that decisions with respect to these matters are
"rarely to be disturbed."' 9' Local 1325, Retail Clerks International Associa-
tion 192 sets out the precise standard of review. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit instructed that a reviewing
court should assure that the Board has articulated the factors underlying its
decision and determine whether these factors are sufficiently substantial to
defend a claim of unreasoned arbitrariness. 93
VIII. CONCLUSION
The LMRA's provisions for review of NLRB representation decisions cre-
ate a disparity in our federal labor laws. An employer can trigger the Act's
review provisions and obtain review by committing a section 8(a)(5) refusal
to bargain violation. Although a union may potentially trigger the Act's
review provisions by committing a section 8(b)(7)(B) unlawful recognitional
picketing violation, the judiciary frequently does not permit review of a rep-
resentation decision through the 8(b)(7)(B) mechanism. Therefore, a union
may find itself without a method of obtaining review.
The disparities created by the Act's review provisions may add to the ten-
sions presently existing in American labor relations. Employer coercive con-
duct appears to be increasing, and the NLRB has been more responsive to
employers than to workers and their unions. As a result, workers and un-
189. Id. The Eleventh Circuit further indicated that the standard of review should be
based on arbitrary agency conduct:
[W]e think it enough that the State has shown that the NLRB treated two industries,
identical in all comparable respects, differently, and gave no reasons for doing so. The
NLRB's actions in this case "fall somewhere on the distant side of arbitrary," and
violate the "fundamental principles of reasoned explanation."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
190. See id. (for standard applied by the Eleventh Circuit).
191. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 33 U.S. 485, 491 (1947).
192. 414 F.2d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
193. Id. at 1201; see also J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND
THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 7-8 (Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 3,
1981).
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ions, without a judicial forum in which to challenge NLRB representation
decisions, appear to have lost faith in the Act.
These tensions may be alleviated by the availability of declaratory relief in
the district courts. The congressional scheme governing judicial review
manifests an intent to avoid delays and disruptions in the collective bargain-
ing process. Consequently, the efficacy of the declaratory judgment theory
hinges on whether granting declaratory relief creates any of these harms.
Because a suit for declaratory relief would not result in these harms, declara-
tory relief is consistent with Congress' intent and should be given serious
consideration.
Frank Frio

